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The Civil Rights Act of 1968 was the result of a complex convergence of presidential
public persuasion in a context of increasing domestic violence associated with a series
of summer disturbances and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Analysis of
Lyndon Johnson’s public discourse supporting the 1968 Civil Rights Act reveals that
rhetorical transcendence was employed as a recurrent strategy in attempts to pass leg-
islation.
[T]he very base of man’s condition is his home: he must find promise and peace there.
—Lyndon Baines Johnson,
“Special Message to Congress on Urban Problems: ‘The Crisis of the Cities.’”1
We are all condemned to live together.
— attributed to Albert Camus
The struggle for civil rights in America has perhaps become the key touchstonefor acknowledging, monitoring, and continuing to pursue the realization of
American democratic ideals and principles. Perhaps no modern U.S. era symbolizes
a higher emphasis on the federal pursuit of civil rights than that represented by the
triumphs of Lyndon Johnson’s domestic policies in the mid and late 1960s. In par-
ticular, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have served
as foci for analyses of both domestic presidential policy success and the realization
of civil rights movement goals and objectives. Indeed, these two pieces of legislation
have become indelible markers on the long, bloody road to equal rights for minori-
ties, and they stand as significant normative criteria in our continuing discernment
on the state of justice in America. The civil liberties enacted in and protected through
these laws have reverberated in the hopes of earlier generations of Americans and
continue to have significant repercussions today.
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Less well known and less studied by historians, political scientists, and commu-
nication scholars alike was Lyndon Johnson’s third major civil rights initiative, the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, signed into law on April 11, 1968. During the Johnson
years the new civil rights frontier was extended to the urban ghettoes of the north.
This extension tested the federal government’s capacities to respond effectively to an
increasingly complex, interdependent set of social problems. Overpopulation,
poverty, segregated housing, poor schools, and unemployment coalesced into a
northern nightmare of intractable inner-city realities. Such dire social needs
seemed to require a holistic and far-reaching public policy. The idea was to root out
a history of human deprivation. Thus, in the Johnson administration civil rights
were important foci for domestic policy, and poverty and education programs were
often viewed as key instruments in achieving civil rights. Social justice required gov-
ernment to fashion laws and conduct policies that would protect human rights and
vanquish poverty. The Johnson administration adopted this philosophy because
participants sincerely believed in their ability to implement a revised formula
reflecting an “enlightened” approach. This was the far-reaching rationale of “The
Great Society.” This slogan symbolized a quest that was both political and moral.2
One of the most persistent impediments to the full realization of The Great
Society was the problem of housing. Since the close of World War II, access to ade-
quate housing was particularly difficult for impoverished African Americans.
Moreover, patterns of segregation in the postwar years almost guaranteed that hous-
ing would remain a persistent and intractable problem. When Congress passed the
Housing Act of 1949, it proclaimed a simple goal: “A decent home and a suitable liv-
ing environment for every American family.” While laudable, this objective went
largely unfulfilled. In fact, by 1963 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had deter-
mined that housing was perhaps the most ubiquitous, deeply rooted civil rights
problem in the nation. As one member of Congress observed, “Suburban housing,
virtually closed to non-whites, leads to Negro central cities, with consequent segre-
gation in schools. Bold steps are needed to change this pattern. But how?”3
Part of the difficulty of answering this question can be demonstrated in Lyndon
Johnson’s struggle to combat housing discrimination in the United States. My case
study concerns the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Relying, in part, on primary research
drawn from the archives at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, I will argue
that one of the most difficult and intransigent civil rights issues faced by the presi-
dent was that of open housing. I shall place my primary focus on the open housing
provision of the 1968 Civil Rights Act and maintain that this provision might never
have been realized as public policy in the United States without a number of con-
verging circumstances that helped shape, constrain, and finally release this contro-
versial provision from years of failed legislative activity. In particular, I shall argue
that a complex convergence of presidential public persuasion, internal and external
persuasive advice to Lyndon Johnson, increasing violence associated with civil
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unrest at home, domestic protest over the Vietnam War, and finally, the assassina-
tion of Martin Luther King, Jr. all conspired in time to make a once untenable pub-
lic policy initiative a codified reality. Federal law would finally address housing
discrimination in the United States. Furthermore, I will argue that the battle over
the 1968 Civil Rights Act was emblematic of a recurrent Johnsonian rhetorical strat-
egy, a strategy that earmarked needed legislation as an act of national transcen-
dence. This particular strategy, it will be argued, was a hallmark of the president’s
persuasive activity.
To support the above claims I will (1) outline a brief history of attempts by the
Johnson administration to address housing as a substantive public policy issue; (2)
relate this history to the regnant rhetorical situation, including the various interest
groups shaping and informing this complex public policy initiative; (3) detail two
major “external” events that constrained LBJ’s rhetoric and ultimately proved piv-
otal to the final realization of the act: the summer riots during the Johnson years
and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.; and (4) discuss the rhetorical and
public policy implications of the discursive machinations evidenced in this study.
Both spoken and unspoken words play a central role in the outcome of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, and I will be attentive to each.
HOUSING: THE NEW FRONTIER IN CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY
In February 1964, many Americans “feared school integration would mean housing
integration and falling property values.”4 The administration fought valiantly to
overturn such assumptions. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach addressed can-
didly fears surrounding calls for integrated housing, and he was equally adamant in
attempts to allay such trepidations: “You know what these myths are—they are as
much a part of American folklore as Paul Bunyan: ‘If we let one in they will all come
in.’ ‘They will take over.’ ‘All the whites will move out.’ ‘The neighborhood will dete-
riorate.’ ‘Property values will go down.’ . . . The only way to counter the mythology
of racism is with facts and knowledge.”5 Furthermore, Katzenbach argued that seg-
regation was impractical, politically and economically unsound, and immoral.
Those themes had also been developed by the moderate members of the civil rights
movement. The administration’s new emphasis on housing was based on statistics
that evidenced an horrendous housing shortage.6 A most vexing question
remained: How should the federal government proceed in its efforts to eliminate
the pain associated with this reality?
The “how” question was reduced to a struggle over the most effective means.
Johnson considered a difficult choice between executive action and renewed civil
rights legislation. The president was under considerable pressure as he considered
extending the provisions and the scope of President Kennedy’s 1962 Executive
Order 11063 on housing, and he was wary of acting precipitously.7
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After Johnson’s election in November 1964, A. Philip Randolph argued that
extension of Kennedy’s housing order was vital: “Housing is central to the whole
field of civil rights and no amount of success in any single phase of the civil rights
movement can be sustained as long as racial discrimination in housing persists.”8
Charles Abrams, president, and Edward Rutledge, executive director of the National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH), which claimed to repre-
sent 60 million American citizens through affiliate organizations, wrote to the pres-
ident: “It seems clear that discrimination in housing looms as the major civil rights
issue during the coming decade.” Abrams and Rutledge also called for an extension
of President Kennedy’s Executive Order 11063 as a “first step” in addressing hous-
ing discrimination in the United States.9 Others continued to exhort the president
for immediate action.10
As early as December 1964, the Justice Department was exploring the possibility
of extending President Kennedy’s Executive Order 11063. The assistant attorney
general for the Office of Legal Counsel, Norbert Schlei, explored requiring inde-
pendent banks and savings and loans to abide by federal nondiscrimination policies
in lending practices. According to Justice Department materials compiled in prepa-
ration for the 1968 Civil Rights Act, “Mr. Schlei concluded that such executive
action might be attended by considerable legal and practical difficulties.” By May
1965, Schlei also had determined that while the president, by means of executive
order, did retain the power to prohibit banks and savings and loans from discrimi-
nating against borrowers (for example, African Americans and other minorities),
“he thought it doubtful that the executive had the authority to require banks to
impose nondiscrimination requirements on their borrowers.”11
By early 1966, then, attention focused upon developing legislation rather than on
the use of the executive order. It was determined that a new omnibus civil rights bill
would best accomplish what LBJ had in mind and perhaps, ultimately, serve as a
useful vehicle to appease Congress as well as civil rights advocates. Johnson admin-
istration officials initiated plans for new legislation. Given their inherently contro-
versial nature, such plans would require a good deal of persuasion if they were to be
implemented effectively.
LBJ’S PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION ON BEHALF OF OPEN HOUSING
1966: Addressing “A Profound Hypocrisy”
On April 28, 1966, Lyndon Johnson went before Congress to request additional civil
rights legislation. The president announced the problem and the goal forthrightly:
“[D]iscriminatory racial practices still exist in many American communities. They
deny the Negro his rights as a citizen. They must be ended.”12 The president called
for stronger federal statutes to punish those interfering with civil rights efforts, new
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procedures on jury selection to prevent discrimination, broader powers for the
attorney general in efforts to press desegregation of public facilities and schools,
and legislation that would bar discrimination in the sale or rental of the nation’s
housing.13 Ongoing attacks on civil rights activists had become open wounds to be
cauterized. Therefore, the president recommended that 100 FBI agents and support
personnel be authorized “to deal with civil rights crimes.”14
Johnson argued that his aim was to establish “a more generous idea of brother-
hood and a more responsible conception of equality.” The president maintained
that his goals were a “part of the unfinished business of every state.”15 While the
president issued principled appeals to “brotherhood” and “equality,” it was the eco-
nomic reality underpinning civil rights legislation that was now erupting center
stage. It did no good to guarantee human rights by law if people were neither fed,
nor clothed, nor sheltered. These primary safety nets garnered the attention of both
the president and Congress. An interdependent web of unequal relations, LBJ
argued, had to be rooted out: “It is self-evident that the problems we are struggling
with form a complicated chain of discrimination and lost opportunities. . . . All the
links—poverty, lack of education, underemployment and now discrimination in
housing—must be attacked together.” 16
The key to the legislation, and the most difficult, however, was the housing pro-
vision. Johnson implored, “I ask the Congress to enact the first effective federal law
against discrimination in the sale and rental of housing.”17 The president argued
that the time had come to move beyond President Kennedy’s 1962 executive order;
there was a dire need to be more inclusive than merely protecting government-
insured housing programs. The goal was comprehensive: “end discrimination in all
housing, old and new—not simply in the new housing covered by the Executive
Order.” Johnson proposed that his new legislation was necessary to “cover the sale,
rental and financing of all dwelling units. It will prohibit discrimination, on either
racial or religious grounds, by owners, brokers and lending corporations.” The pres-
ident’s reigning rationale emphasized moral purpose: “As long as the color of a
man’s skin determines his choice of housing, no investment in the physical rebuild-
ing of our cities will free the men and women living there.”18
Johnson’s call for federal housing legislation was interpreted as a hopeful sign by
many in the black community. While the president’s speech was both high-minded
and pointed, subsequent material events would preclude a positive response to his
urgent message. Several material constraints undermined LBJ’s rhetorical efficacy,
including the economy, anticipation of poor performance by the Democrats in the
upcoming off-year elections, committed external opponents, disagreement among
LBJ’s closest advisers, and the newly released report “To Fulfill These Rights,” which
was produced under the auspices of the administration.
By 1966 inflation was tearing at the domestic economy and the Vietnam War was
draining Johnson’s energy and the nation’s coffers. By March 1966 LBJ’s approval
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rating had dropped to 56 percent, his lowest approval rating since 1963.19 The
prospects for the Democrats in the off-year elections also looked bleak. Increased
movement on open housing only promised to make a bad situation worse.20
If the internal political landscape looked bleak, it was even less attractive when
the administration encountered angry, intractable external opponents. The open
housing provision predictably raised the ire of real estate agents concerned with
“property rights” and homeowners who felt it would inevitably lead to a loss of
“property values.” For example, presidential aide Clifford Alexander reported to
Harry McPherson that Eugene P. Cosner, executive vice president of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), was anxious to introduce the president
personally to their newly elected leader. As Alexander described it, “The newly
elected head, from my information, is, by their definition, a moderate. This means
that he is completely against any federal legislation in the field of open housing, but
would favor a voluntary program.”21 The new civil rights initiative announced in
late April was, at best, proving unpopular in many quarters. Moreover, compromise
bills were filling the House and Senate floors, threatening to water down the impact
and long-term effect of the housing provision.
Even the president’s own advisers were in basic disagreement about presidential
endorsement of any proposed compromise. For example, Clark Clifford advised the
president to stand firm: “Certainly the history of housing legislation in cities and
states indicates that the piecemeal approach . . . has minimal effect on changing
housing patterns. I therefore think we should stand firm on Title IV, which you
originally sent to Congress.”22 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach disagreed,
arguing that “half-a-loaf is better than none” and that “compromise will, if enacted,
moot the cry for an Executive Order. Defeat of the housing title will increase those
demands.”23 Such conflicting advice did little to address the pressing need.
By late August 1966, the final report of the President’s White House Conference,
“To Fulfill These Rights,” had been issued by A. Philip Randolph and Benjamin
Heineman. The report’s housing recommendations suggested that the administra-
tion’s bill needed additional strengthening. Conferees recommended that Johnson
forces: (1) use all available federal resources to implement equal opportunity hous-
ing; (2) enforce the existing housing order and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act;
(3) require state licensing for mortgage brokers and builders; (4) expand the
Demonstration Cities program; (5) continue the Rent Supplement Program until a
more comprehensive approach could be implemented; (6) inaugurate a Housing
Industry Program patterned after John F. Kennedy’s earlier Plans for Progress; and
(7) authorize HUD to purchase, lease, and sell land with the intention of providing
housing for all (on a nondiscriminatory basis).24
Despite the constraining effects of the president’s declining popularity, predicted
off-year electoral losses, external opponents, conflicting internal advice, and a neg-
ative report on the administration’s housing efforts, the Civil Rights Act of 1966,
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including the fair housing title, passed the House by an overwhelming vote. A
majority of the Senate also favored the president’s bill, but it came to the floor too
late in the session to break a filibuster. Although Johnson failed to get his legislation
adopted in 1966, he remained undeterred.
1967: A Year of Violence, A Year of Pain
Johnson’s February 15, 1967, message to Congress on “Equal Justice” was rhetori-
cally consistent with his earlier pleading and as morally succinct:
Last year [1966] the legislation I proposed to ban discrimination in housing stirred
great controversy. Although a majority of both Houses in Congress favored that legis-
lation, it was not enacted. Some of the problems raised by its adversaries were real;
most involved myths and misinformation. The summer riots in our cities did as much
damage to the chances of passing that legislation as the unfounded fears of many
Americans and the opposition of special interest groups. . . . I am proposing fair hous-
ing legislation again this year because it is decent and right. Injustice must be opposed,
however difficult or unpopular the issue.25
Indeed, the president assured the Congress that his goal remained unchanged.
He was interested in: “not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact
and as a result.”26 For Lyndon Johnson, these words seemed no less true in 1967
than they had in 1965. Despite the principled rhetoric, the president found no new
slogan, no startling metaphor, no fresh rhetorical perspective to launch his renewed
legislation. His reversion to words he had summoned in his Howard University
address almost bespoke of a kind of “past glory.” The president seemed to be in the
awkward position of reaching back to press ahead.
In point of fact, this latest presidential message was largely interpreted as mere
“ritual.” After all, the measures for 1967 were largely the same as those proposed in
1966, and Johnson was perceived by many as merely trying to hold on to failed leg-
islation. As one writer for Newsweek magazine observed: “This time . . . Congress
itself stood transformed at least in part by the white backlash—and less hospitable
than ever to the cause of the Negro American. The president measured his words
accordingly: his civil rights message for 1967 was not so much a clarion call to
action as a plea to persevere.” While the speech was judged as “not without its elo-
quent moments,” it was predicted that “Congress, not the President, would over-
come—and that the bill would languish into the campaign year of 1968.” 27 There
are two circumstances that help explain this negative evaluation: Martin Luther
King’s newly announced opposition to the Vietnam War and continuing complexi-
ties associated with the summer urban riots. Each of these events directly impugned
LBJ’s leadership.
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The Vietnam War took its toll on the president’s popularity and political viabil-
ity.28 It inevitably spilled over to his domestic agenda. LBJ felt his housing provision
would be the linchpin of any significant civil rights act. Time and again, LBJ displayed
his sympathy with the plight of African Americans, especially those who were serv-
ing in Vietnam. Indeed the president had publicly stated numerous times that there
was a marked inconsistency between fighting for freedom abroad and the inability to
exercise basic freedoms at home, such as free choice in housing. By April 1967, how-
ever, there was a new tension between Johnson and civil rights advocates. Martin
Luther King had publicly and forcefully declared his opposition to the war in
Vietnam.29 This declaration threatened to split the civil rights movement internally,
angered the president and other liberals who were struggling to provide more civil
rights legislation, and gave the enemies of civil rights additional grounds for an
already virulent opposition. Thus, King’s opposition to Vietnam tended to over-
shadow Johnson’s housing initiative, weakened its support, and buoyed the opposi-
tion. For Lyndon Johnson, it was as if Martin Luther King, Jr. had inexplicably lobbed
a Molotov cocktail into the Oval Office. Given these developments, and the direct
challenge they posed to the president’s leadership, LBJ’s motivation to pursue a third
major civil rights bill might well have been enervated. A confidential FBI report sum-
marized at least part of the concern raised in this turn of events: “In the long run, the
consolidated civil-rights-peace movement will be detrimental to the national security
and the best interests of the nation, for it will not only tend to encourage the enemy
and prolong the Vietnam war but will also have an adverse effect on the cause of civil
rights.”30 The potential for a new public alliance between peace protesters and civil
rights advocates also signaled an ominous new period of strained relations between
the president, civil rights advocates, and the Congress. None of this boded well for the
1967 housing bill. King’s opposition to the war angered the administration and was
viewed as disloyal. It is possible that King’s action dampened the president’s resolve
to press forward on the bill. The conflict with King, however, was probably much less
threatening to the president’s new civil rights legislation than the annual urban con-
flagrations, which impugned Johnson’s leadership, sorely tested national comity, and
led to increasing calls for stricter laws to control the widespread violence.31
A succession of summer riots during the president’s tenure was central to grow-
ing negative perceptions of his leadership.32 As they steeled for another summer of
social unrest, administration officials sought to avert a potential race war, growing
division, and a virulent white backlash. Simultaneously, the statistics on racial
inequality continued to mount.33 Many Americans and their representatives in
Congress also anticipated another summer of violent disturbances and they were in
no mood for a civil rights package that would in any way signal compromise with
violent forces. In this time of crisis, many felt that giving in to “Negro demands”
meant courting continued anarchy and violent division. Such people took a “law-
and-order-first” approach to the problem.
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As predicted, summer violence broke out in both Newark and Detroit.34 Johnson
referred to the riots as “civil disorders.” From the vantage point of detractors, the
president was merely employing a euphemism that masked an intractable problem.
At a minimum LBJ was on the horns of a significant dilemma. As P. H. Zernicke
described it, “The President could neither condone civil disobedience nor condemn
the legitimate grievances of black Americans.”35 White America demanded that the
president exercise his constitutional mandate to “preserve domestic tranquility.”
Simultaneously, LBJ, who seemed “genuinely sympathetic” to the black plight, was
also desirous of maintaining black and white political support. This desire, which
was “consistent with Johnson’s pursuit of personal affection and presidential
immortality,” was not necessarily easily achieved.36
In the president’s view, the urban ghettoes had become seething cauldrons of
neglect, despair, and unrest. LBJ was convinced that the summer violence was a
direct outcome of the misery and poverty at the core of the nation’s urban centers.37
Johnson seemed unsure as to why his earlier initiatives had not stemmed the tide,
or at least led to notable amelioration. On July 27, 1967, the president announced
the appointment of the Kerner Commission, which had as its charge to investigate
the causes of the urban violence and to suggest remedies. This move was intended
as a gesture of presidential action. Some advisers felt such an advisory panel also
might help soften expected congressional investigations into the riots and buy more
time for a variety of LBJ’s urban aid programs.
The riots continued their negative effect on public attitudes toward race relations
in general and housing in particular. Fred Panzer informed the president that
August 1967 poll results revealed that “[b]asic white attitudes toward integration in
housing have not changed since 1963. But close to one out of three white persons
now have a lower regard for Negroes because of the recent riots.”38 Lyndon Johnson
felt he had no choice but to move more legislation forward. Indeed, by August 1967
the administration had become convinced that “existing proposals for model cities,
housing, and crime control bills could improve inner-city life and prevent riots.”39
In sum, the summer riots that had followed a tempestuous spring made LBJ’s
legislative task even more difficult. The images of cities aflame, looting, and a gen-
eral feeling of lawlessness had also had a stiffening effect on both congressional and
public attitudes toward advancing civil rights. In the context of the times, many
people seemed unwilling to, in their view, “reward” blacks for violent activity.
Congress, for its part, did not want to be perceived as kowtowing to militant
demands. Many sectors of the public joined with congressional leaders to demand
that “order in the streets” be restored before making any further attempts either to
integrate or to improve urban neighborhoods.
Public opinion and congressional support sagged under the weight of an expen-
sive and unpopular war abroad and urban violence at home, both of which drained
the little lifeblood left of a flagging Great Society program. Thus, both the riots and
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the war militated against LBJ’s popularity, if not his grand ambitions. These two
political “problems” were certain to affect the 1968 elections. By the summer of
1967, “Johnson’s presidency was being torn at both ends.”40
As in 1966, the 1967 housing measure remained the most contentious part of
the administration’s attempted civil rights measures. The housing provision cut to
the bone. Marching in the streets to obtain justice was one thing—requiring
Americans to live in colorblind neighborhoods by law and attempting to integrate
individual homes and rental properties through the imposition of federal legal
sanctions were, for many, quite another. The proposed package for 1967 fared no
better than the one offered in 1966. The housing portion of the bill still remained
its Achilles’ heel. Johnson had barely delivered the speech introducing the legisla-
tion when Fred Panzer observed: “I have been informed by HUD that the National
Association of Homebuilders will be silent or unhappy over the Equal Justice
Message. Reason: They are concerned about the gradual approach in ending hous-
ing discrimination. They fear it hurts their members’ competitive position in the
housing market.”41
When the 1967 omnibus civil rights bill made little headway, it was decided to
break the bill up, especially because of the intense pressure to legislate control in the
streets. Congress was wary of even a “diluted” open housing provision and of pro-
visions protecting civil rights workers at the expense of the individual states. Most
members were most intent on the need for an anti-riots bill as an attachment to the
omnibus legislation. None of this, however, was accomplished. In essence, the 1966
civil rights initiative failed and most of 1967 was spent trying to revive it.42
1968: Another Civil Rights Message and the King Assassination
The preparations for yet another civil rights address came on the heels of Lyndon
Johnson’s annual State of the Union address, wherein he pledged to mount yet
another attempt at civil rights legislation. Only one week after delivering his mes-
sage on the state of the nation, the president, in his January 24, 1968, “Special
Message to Congress on Civil Rights,” announced he would send legislation to the
Hill intended to protect civil rights advocates, increase the enforcement powers of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), remove discrimination
in federal and state jury systems, and finally, achieve fair housing and a larger
national housing stock.43 LBJ also pledged to send Congress a $1 billion Model
Cities program and a plan for a “ten-year campaign to build six million new decent
housing units for low and middle-income families.” Arguing that the mere con-
struction of new housing was “not enough—unless every family is free to purchase
and rent them,” the president also reaffirmed his unwavering desire to combat dis-
crimination in housing: “Every American who wishes to buy a home, and can afford
it, should be free to do so.”44
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Announcing a controversial staged policy implementation similar to earlier
failed attempts, the president said his effort would be directed at all housing and
rental units in the United States and would be applied in an orderly fashion: First,
immediately to housing covered by John Kennedy’s earlier executive order, then to
dwellings sold or rented by non-occupants and to units housing five or more fam-
ilies, and finally to all housing stock in America. The proposed legislation would
cover discriminatory practices in financing, bar “block-busting,” and be enforced by
HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development) and by the Justice
Department in the person of the attorney general.45 The president tried to frame
public expectations in accordance with his own view of the situation: “A fair hous-
ing law is not a cure-all for the Nation’s urban problems. But ending discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing is essential for social justice and social progress.” 46
When adopted, the legislation would cover approximately 80 percent of all U.S.
housing stock.
The president was well aware that he was on the horns of a dilemma. The sum-
mer 1967 riots had further vitiated the rationale and congressional clamor for
extending civil rights. Johnson faced this nemesis directly: “Lawlessness must be
punished—sternly and promptly. But the criminal conduct of some must not
weaken our resolve to deal with the real grievances of all those who suffer discrim-
ination. Nothing can justify the continued denial of equal justice and opportunity
to every American.”47 Johnson was persistent in his appeals to principles of justice,
equality, and social progress; he seemed determined not to let the violence deter his
legislation.
Cognizant of calls for law and order and anxious to protect the rights of civil
rights workers and those they worked with, and equally aware of the delicate polit-
ical terrain yet to be traversed, LBJ engaged in negotiations with the Senate. While
the House had passed a relatively toothless civil rights bill in the summer of 1967,
there was a bit more progress with the 1968 Senate.48
The NCDH hailed Johnson’s “forthright and practical message” and praised him
for incorporating “the two essential elements in any program to solve the nation’s
housing dilemma: A massive increase in the supply of decent housing for the masses
of Americans, and guaranteeing under law equal access to housing throughout the
market.”49 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Washington Bureau Chief Clarence Mitchell, credited by many as the point man on
LBJ’s legislation, praised Johnson’s message, but warned: “Each delay in considera-
tion of these vital bills is a moment of peril for the nation’s reputation for fairness
and justice.”50
As was its usual custom, after introducing the legislation with the impetus of a
presidential speech, administration aides immediately went about the intricacies of
trying to ensure its passage. This meant trying to shape disparate forces toward suc-
cessful enactment. On February 13, 1968, Mike Manatos informed the president that
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Senator Mike Mansfield was determined to dispose of the civil rights bill “one way or
another” by the end of the week. Manatos was anything but serene regarding the out-
come: “Unless he can work out some sort of compromise with Senator [Everett]
Dirksen, which now seems unlikely, he intends to move for cloture on Monday. If
cloture fails it is his plan to lay the bill aside and to proceed with other Senate busi-
ness.”51 By February 17, 1968, both Ramsey Clark and Walter Mondale had urged the
president to make a statement on the upcoming Senate vote. On February 19, the
president sent a public letter to Senator Philip A. Hart urging that the Senate pass his
bill.52 On February 20, 1968 Ramsey Clark, in an upbeat mood, wrote the president:
“We are . . . very close to a major civil rights achievement.”53 As Time magazine noted,
“[A] Republican-Democratic liberal coalition, improbably abetted by Minority
Leader Everett Dirksen, pushed through the open housing provision and sent the
much expanded package back across Capitol Hill to the House.”54
Indeed, after a successful Senate vote of 71 to 20 on March 11, 1968, Johnson, for
his part, wrote a letter to House Speaker John McCormack urging prompt action.
Johnson was particularly mindful of the need for the housing portion of the
omnibus legislation. The president invoked an increasingly familiar argument as
one of his rationales for passing the legislation:
To one man—the Negro veteran of Vietnam—the fair housing provision will have a
special meaning. I do not need to tell you what he has done for our country. It is up
to us—to all of us—to assure him the elemental rights in his own country for which
he risked his life overseas. That man—and his race—are entitled to the justice this bill
provides.55
Evidence of Johnson’s commitment is reinforced in the encouragement he
directed at the NAACP’s Clarence Mitchell: “I know how hard you worked—and
still must work, to assure the final adoption of this landmark bill. Its passage is
essential from every practical and moral point of view. Its friends must not rest until
it becomes the law of the land.” 56
The administration debated how best to hoist its bill over some dangerous hur-
dles. In particular, there was a row over whether the bill should be sent to confer-
ence committee, where it had the potential to be significantly watered down or
buried, or whether the bill should be sent directly to the House floor where there
could be a swift vote to concur with the Senate version that had already passed.57 As
the machinations in the House of Representatives over the omnibus bill continued,
a profound series of events was about to rearrange the political landscape in
America yet again.
On March 31, 1968, Lyndon Johnson shocked the nation with his announcement
that he would not seek another term as president of the United States. While Johnson
may have ascribed his decision to reasons of health and as a selfless, last-ditch
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attempt to bring the conflict in Southeast Asia to a conclusion, some felt that the war
in Vietnam had finally broken the spirit of this seemingly indomitable man.58
Regardless of the motivation for LBJ’s withdrawal, brokering any new legislation
would now be more difficult. Days later, yet another bombshell would shatter the
nation and splinter hopes for accord in race relations.
Martin Luther King was assassinated on April 4, 1968. This event provided the
president with a unique rhetorical challenge and it was strewn with potential land
mines. The president went on national radio and television to deliver a brief eulogy
asking Americans to pray for peace and to end “lawlessness and divisiveness” in the
land.59 The next day the president addressed the nation in more detail, trying to
soothe hearts and minds that were now fully roiling over King’s death. The president
also tried desperately to find words to help quell the civil disturbances: “The life of a
man who symbolized the freedom and faith of America has been taken. But it is the
fiber and fabric of the Republic that is being tested.” LBJ called upon all Americans
to “deny violence its victory in this sorrowful time and in all times to come.” The
president issued a special proclamation and ordered the flag flown at half-mast in
tribute to King and as a sign of national mourning. Johnson promised to call a joint
session of Congress and to deliver a message with “suggestions for action” no later
than the following Monday. LBJ’s intent was clear: “We must move with urgency, with
resolve, and with new energy in the Congress, in the Courts, in the White House, the
statehouses and the city halls of the Nation, wherever there is leadership . . . until we
do overcome.” The promised message was postponed in light of ensuing events.60
From April 4 through April 11 a rash of violent outbreaks engulfed a host of U.S.
cities. The president had to issue a special order to restore law and order in
Washington, D.C. Even the nation’s capital was a site of seemingly profound insur-
rection. The King assassination and the civil disturbances that followed threatened
to place a sizable crimp in the president’s plans to achieve a third major civil rights
act during his administration.61
The president received much advice as to how to handle his response to the King
assassination and the riots that immediately followed. As the president and his staff
wrestled with the attendant problems, a number of complicated decisions loomed
in LBJ’s fight for the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The situation was extremely delicate.
The administration had to act, but it could not be perceived as “giving in” to the
forces of violence.
From the vantage point of White House aides, any public presidential reaction to
the King assassination and its fiery wake called for tact in public relations, political
savvy, and spin control. Having already eulogized King, proclaimed a day of
national mourning, and appealed to the nation to recultivate its traditional sense of
law and order, the problem now was how to save the president’s legislation and
simultaneously contain a smoldering national urban rebellion. This was a tall and
complicated order—especially with smoke still billowing over the nation’s capital.
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The immediate challenge Johnson faced—and had to solve quickly—was decid-
ing among a bevy of incoming but differing perspectives and recommendations.
Whatever LBJ might decide, administration officials were unanimous in the opin-
ion that it had to be something profound and dramatic. They planned to address
the American public on the riots but worried over content, timing, and effective
alternative ameliorative actions. There was also the matter of the King funeral,
which they now knew would impact both the symbolic political environment and
the timing and strategies adopted on the legislative process.
On April 5, Ben Wattenberg advised the president that his contacts felt that it was
in the president’s interest to meet with black power advocates, outline his new pro-
posals, and ask them to help him implement his initiatives, especially on housing.
In addition, Wattenberg cited “an intense need for symbolic acts by the President.”
Wattenberg, however, advised caution in that a meeting with black power advocates
could have “explosive aspects to it.”62 Ed Wynne of the Office of Education sug-
gested that the president declare in his planned address that an annual day be set
aside to honor slain civil rights leaders and that Johnson should announce that
there will be a monument built in their name. Since these martyrs were both white
and black, such a symbolic action would emphasize civil rights as “an American
struggle for American ideals, just as Valley Forge was.”63
On April 6, Fred Panzer informed Johnson that Lou Harris suggested that prior to
any legislation an appeal should be made to the populace to “deposit their guns at
their churches.” In addition, Panzer called for detailed anti-riot laws for inclusion in
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, including federal legislation against shooting at firefighters.
Panzer, looking for “symbolic reassurance” for a shocked and aroused citizenry, felt
the white community would be most pleased if Stokely Carmichael were arrested by
Walter Washington because “it would symbolize that black power extremists do not rep-
resent the vast majority of Negroes.” Panzer also advised LBJ to stress the need for his
open housing provision, to ask Congress to pass his bill within 72 hours, and to seize
the moment by “introduc[ing] something dramatic.” Perhaps, Panzer mused, now
was the hour to mount a “drastic program for the lost generation of ghetto children
and teenagers” who were seen in many of the televised images of rioting. As “players
in the carnival of looting,” they remained “the tinder of civil disorders.” Therefore,
Panzer argued: “There must be some way to remove them from the scene—for their
own sake as well as society’s. In other words can the government do for them what
rich parents do for their children, i.e., send them to prep schools, summer camps,
etc.”64 The president’s political instincts must have been simultaneously engaged and
shaken by such advice. Despite the agony of another national assassination, a politi-
cal opportunity had presented itself. In the Johnson administration such an opening
suggested one obvious and habitual tack: exploitation by all necessary means.
Clifford Alexander cautioned the president to use “firmness” against the rioters
and looters. He told the president that Mayor Washington and others ought to
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appear on local television every half hour to announce that “looters will be handled
with immediate but reasonable force,” and to affirm publicly the fact that while the
administration was responding with reason, additional force might be necessary to
restore order. Alexander, echoing Panzer’s sentiments, also told the president “we
have plenty to arrest Carmichael on and should do so immediately and be sure he
is put in a jail outside of the District.” Finally, Alexander felt the “vast majority” of
the black populace would endorse increased riot control measures because they also
knew—better than anyone else—that after their neighborhoods were destroyed
“nobody [wa]s going to go in and build [them] up [again] on the assumption that
[they] will be burned down again soon.”65
Albert Cantril of the State Department, cognizant of international ramifications,
suggested that Roy Wilkins draft the president’s address. He also advised that the
global audience be informed “that the rioting was not white against black but was
basically the work of teenage hoodlums.” Cantril counseled the president to divide
his talk into three sections addressing whites, blacks, and all Americans. Finally, he
observed: “There is no better eulogy than to quote extensively from King himself.
The president could do this at considerable length.” The latter two points were not
attractive to Fred Bohen. Bohen observed: “The President’s task is to make people
believe and act as one nation, and the speech should be his speech and his quotes
for history, not Dr. King’s, as eloquent as they were.” Bohen passed Cantril’s mes-
sage to Harry McPherson for his “burgeoning file.”66
Meanwhile, administration officials continued preparations for what aides now
labeled the president’s “Riots Speech” and tentatively scheduled it for Tuesday, April
9, 1968. HUD Secretary Robert Weaver drafted some remarks he hoped the presi-
dent would incorporate into his anticipated upcoming address. He felt the president
should include four major points:
1. The time is right to consider reordering the national priorities. Any appeal to
Congress for increased funding should be accompanied by such a declaration.
Space and highway programs, the SST, and certain non-essential defense expendi-
tures should be re-examined in the light of present exigencies.
2. Negro Americans should not blame the foul deed of one deranged man on all
whites any more than white America should blame all Negroes for current lawless-
ness.
3. The lack of neighborhood outrage against lawlessness is to be deplored. We must
work to create a sense of outrage in America against lawlessness and injustice.
Congress must pass measures already approved by the President to deal with crime
in the streets.
4. Militancy in America arose because the nation has failed to deal effectively with
discrimination and deprivation. This the Kerner Commission appropriately and
rightfully identified. We have made progress, but it has not been enough.
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Weaver wanted the president to employ these four points as arguments for passing
his 1968 civil rights bill, initiating immediate employment and training programs,
and enacting the wide agenda of programs the president had on his plate, including
poverty, health, education, housing, and urban development. The fact that more
monies would be directed toward Weaver’s agency was an effective outcome, if not
the goal of this line of argument. So even in the poverty of social strife, the machi-
nations of power continued to churn. Weaver also asked the president for an oppor-
tunity to comment on the draft of the proposed speech.67
As previously indicated, however, the flurry of activity regarding the need for an
additional strong nationwide symbolic statement by the president went for naught
in the onslaught of ongoing events. It was Lyndon Johnson, however, who helped
shape the rhetorical construction of those events and, in the process, influenced the
legislative outcome. An argument for Lyndon Johnson’s rhetorical opportunism
follows. To make that argument clear, let us return to the president’s public address
immediately following the King assassination.
Recall that on April 5, President Johnson addressed the nation and declared a
national day of mourning for Dr. King. In that address LBJ deliberately tried to
influence public opinion on the need for swift passage of his newest civil rights ini-
tiatives. The president carefully crafted a rhetorical appeal conducive to his ends.
First, he had to respond to the outbreaks of violence and the forces of violence in
the nation that compelled them: “The dream of Martin Luther King, Jr. has not died
with him. Men who are white—men who are black—must and will now join
together as never in the past to let all the forces of divisiveness know that America
shall not be ruled by the bullet, but only by the ballot of free and just men.” Next,
he would extol the progress already made in civil rights, but argue that there was
more left to do that could be done: “We have rolled away some of the stones of inac-
tion, of indifference, and of injustice. Our work is not yet done. But we have begun.”
The scene of action of most import would be in the halls of Congress: “We must
work with urgency, with resolve, and with new energy in Congress . . . until we do
overcome.” The president announced that he would soon deliver an address that
would outline a number of forms of “constructive action.” This would give him the
opportunity to press for his civil rights bill and go beyond it to expand additional
areas in need of attention.68 As things turned out, that address was never delivered.
What Johnson could not deliver by formal public address, he would deliver by per-
sonal and other forms of public persuasion.
Ever the opportunist, the president acted immediately. The very same day LBJ
declared a national day of mourning for King he sent a letter to House Speaker John
McCormick, which appealed for passage of the fair housing bill. This appeal was
premised upon the changed circumstances occurring with the onset of King’s assas-
sination. The president reminded the Speaker of his earlier March 11 entreaty for
open housing legislation. The bill, having been waylaid in the House, argued
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Johnson, was now more important than ever in the wake of the King assassination.
The president was direct:
Last night America was shocked by a senseless act of violence. . . . This tragedy has
caused all good men to look deeply into their hearts. When the Nation so urgently
needs the healing balm of unity, a brutal wound on our conscience forces upon us all
this question: What more can I do to achieve brotherhood and equality among all
Americans? . . . There are many actions the Congress can take, on its part. The most
immediate is to enact legislation so long delayed and so close to fulfillment. We should
pass the Fair Housing law when Congress convenes next week.69
The text of the letter was distributed to news reporters and the public. Thus,
Johnson blatantly pressed his newest rhetorical rationale for passing his civil rights
legislation: “King is dead and America is aflame: we need action now!”
LBJ positioned successful passage of his pending legislation as a mode of tran-
scendence, a political curative that would solve a social problem.70 According to
Kenneth Burke, transcendence is a rhetorical strategy that allows the rhetor to sym-
bolically endow a person, place, object, event, or set of circumstances with “a new
identity.”71 Burke also observes that “transcendence involves a new motive discov-
ered en route.”72 The rhetoric of transcendence is adopted by the rhetor as a means
of advancing a “purified perspective” on events and circumstances in a direct effort
to overcome symbolically perceived negative manifestations.73 To achieve transcen-
dence the rhetor must find a means of “negating the negation.”74 For example, a
“trial by fire” can be rhetorically transformed into a “transcendent burning, light.”75
In the case of Lyndon Johnson, civil rights legislation is presented as a means of
“ritual purification” intended to ameliorate the death of Martin Luther King and
the ensuing riots. Johnson represented his legislation symbolically as the best and
most concrete mode for healing division in the social hierarchy. Civil rights legisla-
tion was positioned and argued as something that went beyond a tribute to King; it
was a modality for meeting the present crisis and getting the nation “beyond” an
inexplicable tragedy. In making this argument to Congress, LBJ turned from prin-
cipled idealistic argument based on fairness, equality, and social progress to that of
the pragmatic and practical. By arguing that his legislation was the best solution to
the problem at hand, the president helped forge a strong logic for his housing leg-
islation, its impetus impelled by an argued need for immediate action. This tactic,
intentionally selected and scrupulously applied, served LBJ well. Thus, Johnson’s
rhetoric of transcendence allowed him, in Kenneth Burke’s words, to “‘transcend’
the sheerly empirical events of . . . the times” through linguistic transformation.76
Congress, for its part, which had indeed long languished on this bill, reacted with
the swiftness Lyndon Johnson had demanded. The King assassination had shifted the
political alignments. For example, William McCulloch, the ranking Republican on
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the House Judiciary Committee, broke ranks with House Republican leader Gerald
Ford, who opposed the bill. Illinois’s John Anderson did the same, followed by more
than a dozen other Republicans. Given this changed political terrain in the wake of
the King assassination, Johnson was confident that he probably had enough votes to
overcome opposition in the House. He decided to cancel his “constructive action” or
“riots” speech in an effort not to antagonize the new converts by seeming to take sole
credit for the bill and other proposed curatives. He now judged he had a critical mass
of bipartisan support for new civil rights legislation within his grasp, and he was
determined to say nothing that might upset it. In this instance, Johnson had aban-
doned public words to press for deeds—and his strategy was highly successful.77
Meanwhile the violent outbreaks in America continued. On April 6, the acting
governor of Illinois requested federal troops to quell disturbances in Chicago. On
April 7, the governor of Maryland requested federal troops to protect Baltimore.78
On April 10, 1968, the House voted to concur with the Senate bill, which meant that
Congress had formally passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968. In a news conference
that same day, the president reflected: “It has been a long, tortuous, and difficult
road.”79 As Johnson observed: “A few years ago when we met here in the White
House and discussed open housing and how to handle it by regulation or statute,
there were very few who thought that in our time we could bring this justice to all
Americans. But the Congress today has shown that if we have the will, there is a
way.”80 The president had the will and he was determined to find a way. Harry
Middleton, a Johnson confidant and the speechwriter for the 1968 Civil Rights Act
signing ceremony statement, acknowledged that Johnson “intentionally” used the
King assassination as a means of achieving his long-delayed housing legislation.81
Even the symbolic rituals associated with the passage of the 1968 act were polit-
ically charged. Johnson had once again acted on behalf of African American civil
rights but, in the aftermath of the civil unrest associated with the King assassina-
tion, there remained suspicions as to whether his actions and those of Congress had
been taken under duress, if not coercion. On April 10, 1968, Barefoot Sanders
informed the president that Clarence Mitchell was advocating a signing ceremony
for the civil rights bill, even if it involved delay in enactment. In affirming this
request, Sanders observed: “I agree with Clarence. The Open Housing bill is an
accomplishment that no one thought obtainable. We should have a signing cere-
mony in order to focus attention on it. Further, it seems to me that if the President
signs the bill in a hurry without a ceremony that the impression may be left with the
public that the bill is being rushed into law in response to the recent riots. That
would be an erroneous impression.”82 Erroneous or not, at the signing ceremony on
April 11, the president observed: “[T]his bill has had a long and stormy trip.”
Nevertheless, Johnson took some comfort: “with this bill, the voice of justice speaks
again.” Indeed, the president did not seem to unduly boast in stating: “I think we
can all take some heart that democracy’s work is being done.”83 But many felt it took
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the death of King and an incredible amount of national unrest to nudge the demo-
cratic spirit along.
LBJ, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE RHETORIC OF TRANSCENDENCE
Wayne Fields, commenting on the president’s propensity for rhetorical leadership,
observes: “No president in recent history has more blatantly tried to bend the coun-
try to his own will than did Lyndon Johnson.”84 As George C. Edwards has indi-
cated, a president must lead the public, set priorities, and exploit opportunities.85
The 1968 Civil Rights Act demonstrated President Johnson’s penchant to “bend the
country to his own will” and to exercise leadership in word and deed, but it was also
an exercise conducted in the wake of intense national mourning and division. Given
these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Lyndon Johnson’s final major
attempt at civil rights legislation was mired in controversy.
The president displayed persistence, adaptability, and opportunism in his quest
for victory. First, he refused to let the housing legislation die, even after experienc-
ing two defeats in Congress. Second, he, along with his administrative staff, tinkered
with the provisions in an effort to make them acceptable to an inhospitable
Congress. Third, LBJ consciously and calmly transformed the King assassination
into a rationale for passing legislation that included his housing provision. Here, I
believe we uncover a uniquely Johnsonian rhetorical pattern—the use of rhetorical
transcendence as a mode of argument for public policy. Fourth, by canceling the
“riots speech,” the president displayed judicious rhetorical restraint; in the process
he assured himself a legislative victory. Both discourse delivered and discourse sup-
pressed are important components of compromise and success in the presidency.
There was a delicate balance in need of observance and it was one that Johnson fol-
lowed by both predilection and design. Spoken and unspoken words are acts of
leadership. When executed well, they can subsist as the sign and substance of indeli-
ble deeds. Traditionally deeds are looked upon as primary. But as we have seen,
deeds also require rhetorical framing. From the policy side of the equation, on the
open housing issue in particular, the president demonstrated a “persistent commit-
ment . . . long after most of his advisers suggested that he give up.”86
History and rhetorical invention often provide opportunities for unique appro-
priation. It was Johnson’s rhetorical genius to interpret and orchestrate historical
events as opportune moments for public arguments on behalf of legislative change. As
Bornet “reluctantly” observes, all of the civil rights legislation passed in the 1960s
“was accelerated by acts of violence.”87 The rhetorical challenge was to find the proper
appeals in such an inflammatory environment. History dealt Lyndon Johnson a series
of violent circumstances that he rhetorically transformed from Good Friday events to
Easter Sunday celebrations. Such a complicated rhetorical feat required legislative
and rhetorical compromise. It was patently obvious that the riots following the King
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assassination made the law and order provisions of the civil rights bill sacrosanct.
Both LBJ and Congress were not about to give up on civil order. They were both will-
ing to extend civil rights, but not without the civil order provisions securely in place.
Many came to view the fair housing bill as an “act of atonement” for the King
assassination.88 I believe, however, that Johnson’s arguments were premised on
slightly different, but certainly related grounds. During his entire presidency
Johnson utilized a series of tragic historical events to gain political advantage. While
Johnson’s encounter with tragic history yielded the Good Friday-Easter Sunday
rhetorical stratagem employed after the King assassination, it was anything but an
anomaly. In fact, there is evidence of a distinct pattern in LBJ’s response to tragedy
in his public address. More than a simple matter of atonement, this recurring pat-
tern of rhetorical invention demonstrates the linkage between rhetoric and public
policy. Time and again, LBJ inextricably linked word and deed by representing leg-
islation as an act of public transcendence that would redeem the nation. New laws
were presented as palpable means of national recovery.
In 1963, Johnson mourned President Kennedy with the theme: “Let us con-
tinue.” He stated: “The greatest leader of our time has been struck down by the
foulest deed of our time.” Johnson referred to many of JFK’s “dreams,” which had
been “vitalized by his drive and by his dedication”: “Above all, [was] the dream of
equal rights for all Americans, whatever their race or color.” And Johnson would
transform Kennedy’s assassination into a rhetorical opportunity of political conse-
quence. Johnson created and argued a means of national transcendence by insisting
on present action: “Our most immediate tasks are here on this Hill. . . . no memo-
rial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory
than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.”
Early passage of that bill and his pending tax bill, LBJ argued, would “continue the
work of President Kennedy.” Not coincidently, it would also further LBJ’s own goals
and ambitions. These words were precursors to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89
In like manner, Johnson’s creative powers of rhetorical invention helped shape
political opportunity in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In a statement
decrying the violence encountered in Selma, on the infamous Edward Pettus
Bridge, the president observed: “ I am certain Americans everywhere join in deplor-
ing the brutality with which a number of Negro citizens of Alabama were treated
when they sought to dramatize their deep and sincere interest in attaining the pre-
cious right to vote. The best legal talent in the Federal Government is engaged in
preparing legislation which will secure that right for every American.”90
Four days later, at a March 13 press conference, Johnson intoned: “This March
week has brought a very deep and painful challenge to the unending search for
American freedom. . . . But the final answer to this problem will be found not in
armed confrontation, but in the process of law.” Furthermore, Johnson argued that
Selma represented “a much larger meaning”; it was, in fact, “a protest against a deep
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and very unjust flaw in American democracy itself.” Indeed, the constitutional right
to vote was being denied and this denial required rectification: “Ninety-five years ago
our Constitution was amended to require that no Americans be denied the right to
vote because of race or color. Almost a century later, many Americans are kept from
voting simply because they are Negroes. Therefore, this Monday I will send to the
Congress a request for legislation to carry out the amendment to the Constitution.”
For the president, “What happened in Selma was an American tragedy” that simply
“strengthen[ed] the determination of each of us to bring full and equal and exact
justice to all our people.”91 LBJ rhetorically reconstructed Selma as a symbol of a
“tragic flaw” in American character and democracy, and he transformed this refer-
ence to place and space to a clarion call for “full and equal and exact justice” through
legislation.
On March 15, when Lyndon Johnson introduced his legislation for the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to a joint session of Congress, he not only compared Selma to
other hallowed grounds where blood had been shed in freedom’s cause, he also reit-
erated that the solution to Selma and the continued cause for hope and progress in
the future certainly were earmarked by this piece of important legislation: “There is
no cause for pride in what has happened in Selma. There is no cause for self-satis-
faction in the long denial of equal rights of millions of Americans. But there is cause
for hope and faith in our democracy in what is happening here tonight.”92
Finally, on August 6, 1965, at the signing ceremony for the Civil Rights Act of
1965, Lyndon Johnson reiterated the meaning of Selma and his proposed “cure”:
Last March, with the outrage of Selma still fresh, I came down to this Capitol one
evening and asked the Congress and the people for swift and sweeping action to guar-
antee every man and woman the right to vote. In less than 48 hours I sent the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to Congress. In little more than 4 months the Congress, with over-
whelming majorities, enacted one of the most monumental laws in the entire history
of American freedom.93
A similar rhetorical pattern of rhetorical transcendence through legislation is
evident in Johnson’s response to the assassination of Robert Kennedy, which
occurred approximately two months after Martin Luther King’s. In this instance,
LBJ sought viable federal laws regulating gun control. In an address to the nation
following the assassination attempt (RFK had not yet succumbed to the assassin’s
bullet), Johnson issued a prophetic proclamation: “A nation that tolerates violence
in any form cannot expect to be able to confine it to just minor outbursts.”
Therefore, Johnson resolved: “Let the Congress pass laws to bring the insane traffic
in guns to a halt, as I have appealed to them time and again to do.”94 The next day,
June 6, LBJ sent letters to both the Senate and the House expressing the need for leg-
islation. The letters referred to the earlier “mail order murder” of John F. Kennedy
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and declared that “[t]he voices of the few must no longer prevail over the interests
of the many.”95
Thus all the major tragic events in the Johnson era, save perhaps Vietnam—the
two Kennedy assassinations, the violence of Selma, and the King assassination—
were forcefully interpreted by Lyndon Johnson as unique, historically ordained
inventional sites for rhetorical transcendence. For LBJ, in both rhetorical and polit-
ical terms, transcendence was dependent on legislative action—be it the extension
of civil rights or gun control. By both word and deed, Johnson imbued the nation
with a distinctly hopeful sense that, despite the violence and the seeming chaos of
the day, there were palpable means of recovery and redemption—and those mea-
sures could be codified into law. Johnson forcefully reconstituted the meaning of
events and then shaped the words to match the required action. On idealistic
grounds, Johnson argued for material change. In this instance justice that could not
be codified was justice denied. In some ways this rhetorical-political tactic may have
been part of Johnson’s Achilles’ heel. The legislation that was enacted raised hopes
while simultaneously dashing them when the law could not or did not go far
enough to protect civil rights, civil rights workers, and the quality of life of the
nation’s poorest citizens.
Harvard Sitkoff was skeptical of the efficacy of the actual civil rights legislation
that received congressional approval in 1968: “[T]he measure had impossibly weak
enforcement provisions, and placed the burden of combating racial discrimination
on individual litigants. In addition, the law appeased, even pleased, the white
majority by making incitement to riot a serious federal offense.”96 The law also did
not prevent federal funds from being used to support segregated housing in the
years that followed. The 1968 Kerner Commission report scored the federal gov-
ernment’s public housing program on this very point. Another study by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights appearing in 1970 identified equal housing as a “per-
sistent problem.”97 HUD apparently intended a very vigorous administration and
enforcement of the 1968 Civil Rights Act but was undermined by Congress, which
appropriated only $2 million of the $9 million requested for such purposes for the
first year.98 Nonetheless, given the fractious conditions attending this protracted
struggle, the president’s legislative triumph has also been judged, in Steven F.
Lawson’s words, “a significant feat”—accomplished under some of the most trying
conditions in race relations in our nation’s history since the Civil War.99
CONCLUSION
President Johnson had started his campaign for fair housing in earnest in April 1966.
Two years later, his efforts finally came to fruition. Johnson had tasted two bitter,
although not entirely unexpected, defeats before indulging in the fruits of victory—
and it proved to be an unlikely victory—captured by a lame-duck president from the
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South during a week of grief and national riots following the death of Martin Luther
King, Jr. In a cold, calculated, yet humane way, Johnson used King’s death, the ensu-
ing riots, the continuing tumult of events, and the universally acknowledged rotting
core of the nation’s cities as a warrant to press human rights where no president had
gone before. As Wayne Fields declares: “Johnson went farther than any other previ-
ous president to legitimate the civil rights cause, defending even more than its
morality its consistency with national values and traditions.”100
The 1968 Civil Rights Act was perhaps an even more remarkable demonstration
of presidential persistence than the two prior Civil Rights Acts in 1964 and 1965.
While the 1964 Civil Rights Act may have had more symbolic influence and the
1965 Voting Rights Act may have had more lasting political significance, the 1968
Civil Rights Act was vintage Johnson—a measure pressed for two years and then
finally manipulated under duress by a relentless president intent on snatching vic-
tory from the jaws of defeat. Johnson’s achievement was one he could rightfully
share with the nation. While the legislative victory may have been helped by Martin
Luther King’s assassination, it was Lyndon Johnson’s political persistence in
employing a rhetoric of transcendence that had finally challenged Americans to
come to terms fully with and act justly in an arena that constituted one of the most
sensitive and volatile domestic policy issues of the decade—fair housing. While
LBJ’s legislation would receive criticism for lacking teeth and kowtowing to white
fears, to his credit, President Johnson never relented and never looked back—save
to savor a hard-won rhetorical and political battle.
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